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ABSTRACT: Some patients suffering from the
same neuropsychiatric disorder may have no overlapping
symptoms whilst others may share symptoms common to
other distinct disorders. Therefore, the Research Domain
Criteria initiative recognises the need for better charac-
terisation of the individual symptoms on which to focus
symptom-based treatment strategies. Many of the disor-
ders involve dysfunction within the prefrontal cortex
(PFC) and so the marmoset, due to their highly devel-
oped PFC and small size, is an ideal species for studying
the neurobiological basis of the behavioural dimensions
that underlie these symptoms.Here we focus on a battery
of tests that address dysfunction spanning the cognitive
(cognitive inflexibility and working memory), negative
valence (fear generalisation and negative bias) and posi-
tive valence (anhedonia) systems pertinent for under-
standing disorders such as ADHD, Schizophrenia,
Anxiety, Depression and OCD. Parsing the separable
prefrontal and striatal circuits and identifying the selec-
tive neurochemical modulation (serotonin vs dopamine)
that underlie cognitive dysfunction have revealed coun-
terparts in the clinical domain. Aspects of the negative
valence system have been explored both at individual-
(trait anxiety and genetic variation in serotonin trans-
porter) and circuit-based levels enabling the understand-
ing of generalisation processes, negative biases and
differential responsiveness to SSRIs. Within the positive
valence system, the combination of cardiovascular and
behavioural measures provides a framework for under-
standing motivational, anticipatory and consummatory
aspects of anhedonia and their neurobiological mecha-
nisms. Together, the direct comparison of experimental
findings in marmosets with clinical studies is proving an
excellent translational model to address the behavioural
dimensions and neurobiology of neuropsychiatric symp-
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INTRODUCTION
One in five people will suffer from a neuropsychiatric
disorder at some point in their life (Kessler et al.,
2009), yet the prognosis for successful treatment is
still only about 40%. Currently, a handful of pharma-
cological and psychological therapies are used to
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treat multiple psychiatric disorders, with the former
mostly targeting the widespread monoamine systems
in the forebrain (Arroll et al., 2005; Miyamoto et al.,
2005). Why is this? First, disorders such as depres-
sion and schizophrenia are broadly defined and two
individuals may be diagnosed with the same disorder
but have no overlapping symptoms, making it unlike-
ly that they will be treated successfully by the same
therapeutic strategy. Second, patients diagnosed with
different psychiatric disorders may share the same
symptom, which could explain why specific pharma-
cological therapies can be used successfully across
multiple disorders. For example, selective serotonin
reuptake blockers can be effective in treating patients
with general anxiety disorder and depression (Rein-
hold et al., 2011; Gorman et al., 2014), probably
because they target a shared symptom, such as
enhanced negative emotion or negative bias. Third,
the clinical symptoms are often poorly characterized
so two patients may exhibit similar symptoms that
actually have different underlying psychological and
neurobiological causes. For instance, anxiety may be
the result of poor learning of predictive cues signal-
ing negative consequences, causing uncertainty, a
known contributor to anxious behavior. Alternatively,
impaired attentional flexibility may promote anxiety
by making it more likely that subjects stay focused
on salient negative stimuli, unable to switch their
attention toward more positive events in the environ-
ment (Clarke et al., 2015; Shiba et al., 2016). Fourth,
even when treatments are successful there is poor
understanding of the underlying psychological and
neurobiological mechanisms, making it difficult to
match specific treatments to specific symptoms in
individual patients.
For all these reasons there is growing emphasis in
clinical and preclinical studies of therapeutic strate-
gies to target common symptoms regardless of the
disorder with which they are associated. Moreover,
improved characterization of these symptoms
requires a fundamental understanding of the psycho-
logical and neurobiological mechanisms that cause
them, as recognized by the Research Domain Criteria
[RDoc; National Institute of Mental Health, (Insel
et al., 2010)]. Although imaging studies of patients
suffering from neuropsychiatric disorders have
revealed much, both in terms of the neural circuits
that appear dysregulated in untreated patients and
reversal of this dysregulation following successful
treatment, it cannot be ascertained whether this dys-
regulation is causal or compensatory. Vital for
achieving this understanding is animal-based
research, in which experimental manipulations can
establish causal relationships and identify the com-
plex interactions between, and within, neural circuits
that underlie adaptive and maladaptive behavior.
Such research can also identify the neural circuits
upon which current therapies act in order to optimize
therapeutic targets, eliminate undesirable side effects,
and identify new therapeutic targets.
A key brain structure showing altered activity
across the range of neuropsychiatric disorders is the
prefrontal cortex (PFC) (Strakowski et al., 2005; Shin
et al., 2006; Etkin and Wager, 2007; Milad and
Rauch, 2007; Koenigs and Grafman, 2009), a multi-
modal cortical association region with the most exten-
sive reciprocal connections with the rest of the
forebrain of all cortical regions (Carmichael and
Price, 1996; Ongur and Price, 2000; Petrides and Pan-
dya, 2002; Petrides, 2005; Petrides and Pandya, 2007;
Petrides et al., 2012; Yeterian et al., 2012). It is also
the only neocortical region that has regulatory control
over the brainstem and forebrain chemically specific
arousal pathways (Arnsten and Goldman-Rakic,
1984) which, along with its direct reciprocal connec-
tions, gives this region a pervasive influence on per-
ceptual, motoric, attentional, mnemonic, language
and emotional systems of the forebrain, both directly
and indirectly. Its anatomical and functional organiza-
tion is relatively preserved across primate species
(Ongur and Price, 2000; Burman et al., 2006; Burman
and Rosa, 2009; Petrides et al., 2012) making Old
World and New World, non-human primates particu-
larly valuable for translational studies of the prefron-
tal circuits that underlie the regulation of behavior.
The marmoset, a New World monkey, is ideal for
studying the effects of interventions within prefrontal
circuits, including their modulation by the monoamine
systems. Their brains are relatively small, compared
with the much larger brained Old World monkeys,
and their cortex, lissencephalic, making it easier to tar-
get localized regions of interest cortically and sub-
cortically, either permanently, via fiber-sparing
excitotoxins (e.g., quinolinic acid) and neurochemi-
cally specific toxins (e.g., 5,7 dihydroxytryptamine),
or temporarily, by infusions of drugs through indwell-
ing cannulae. This will also prove an advantage when
applying state-of-the-art molecular and imaging tech-
niques to neural circuit analysis of cognition and emo-
tion, including optogenetics (MacDougall et al., 2016)
and pharmacogenetics. Like humans, vision and audi-
tion are dominant senses in monkeys, including the
marmoset, (in contrast to rodents in which the domi-
nant sense is olfaction), and the expansion of cortical
processing of these senses in humans is also seen in
non-human primates (Orban et al., 2004; Rauschecker
and Scott, 2009). In addition, compared with rodents,
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marmosets show distinct gene expression patterns in
the visual and prefrontal cortex despite similarities in
genetic markers in many other areas (Mashiko et al.,
2012). This makes primates ideal for translational
studies of higher-order cognitive and affective pro-
cesses using behavioral tests that rely on these domi-
nant senses. An additional advantage of marmosets is
that it is possible to maintain purpose bred colonies
within spacious accommodation at local institutions as
a consequence of their small size and their ease of
breeding in captivity. This allows for the necessary
large scale studies of neural circuits. Maintaining a
large breeding colony allows the investigation of the
interaction between genetic and behavioral traits that
are known risk factors for neuropsychiatric disorders,
for instance, the serotonin transporter polymorphism
and high trait anxiety. The onset of many neuropsychi-
atric disorders occurs during childhood and adoles-
cence (Jones, 2013) and 75% of adults suffering from
a mental disorder have an onset before the age of 25
(Kessler et al., 2005). Thus, the short 5 month gesta-
tion period of marmosets and the fact that they reach
adulthood by 2 years (Abbott and Hearn, 1978; Abbott
et al., 2003; Schultz-Darken et al., 2016) makes them
the ideal primate species in which to study the normal
and abnormal development of prefrontal circuits relat-
ed to these genetic and behavioral risk factors.
In this review we will focus on a number of behav-
ioral dimensions common to a variety of neuropsy-
chiatric disorders and describe the range of cognitive
and affective tests that have been developed to study
their psychological and neurobiological bases in the
marmoset. We will include dimensions associated with
dysfunction in the cognitive (cognitive inflexibility
and working memory), negative valence (fear generali-
zation and negative bias) and positive valence (anhe-
donia) systems, as defined by RDoC (Fig. 1). Since
symptoms are core to neuropsychiatric diagnoses and
Figure 1 RDoc in the marmoset. Tasks developed in the marmoset are represented in white,
linked to the relevant behavioral dimension that is impaired across disorders (blue) and placed with-
in the appropriate system (Cognitive, Negative Valence, and Positive Valence, light blue). [Color
figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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are often the trigger for individuals to seek help and
advice from a clinic, knowledge of the relationship
between behavioral dimensions and symptomatology
is critical for progress in our understanding of the etiol-
ogy and treatment of these disorders.
COGNITIVE SYSTEM DYSFUNCTION,
COGNITIVE INFLEXIBILITY, AND
IMPAIRED WORKING MEMORY
Impairments within the cognitive systems are promi-
nent in disorders such as schizophrenia, obsessive-
compulsive disorder (OCD) and attention deficit
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). These disorders may
share a range of cognitive impairments including def-
icits in cognitive flexibility and inhibitory response
control and aspects of working memory (Morice,
1990; Chamberlain et al., 2005; Castellanos et al.,
2006). Such deficits may also be present in affective
disorders, including anxiety and mood disorders (Air-
aksinen et al., 2005; Mantella et al., 2007; Rock
et al., 2014). Numerous behavioral tasks have been
developed to study cognitive flexibility and working
memory abilities in marmosets. Here we focus on
those tests that have been successfully translated into
clinical and pre-clinical studies in humans, and back
translated into rodents. Specifically, cognitive flexi-
bility has been measured using discrimination
reversal-learning and attentional set shifting tasks,
whilst working memory and its underlying mecha-
nisms have been studied using a spatial self-ordered
sequencing task (Fig. 1). The translational success of
these tasks for modeling the overlapping deficits in
behavioral dimensions and symptoms across disor-
ders has already provided enormous insight into the
separable prefrontal circuits and neurochemically
specific modulation that underlie such dimensions.
Cognitive flexibility is the ability to adapt mental
strategies and actions to the changing contingencies
and conditions of the environment (Ca~nas et al.,
2003). It has been suggested that cognitive inflexibili-
ty underlies the compulsions present in OCD patients
as they shift from flexible, goal directed actions to
persistent maladaptive habitual behaviors (Graybiel
and Rauch, 2000; Gillan et al., 2011). Although cog-
nitive inflexibility has also been linked to persevera-
tive thinking and the inability to perform mental
shifts in schizophrenia (Delahunty et al., 1993; Elliott
et al., 1995; Pantelis et al., 1999), it is unclear wheth-
er it underpins these symptoms or is simply a by-
product of the prefrontal dysfunction associated with
the disorder (Orfei et al., 2013; Weinberger and Ber-
man, 1996). Using the Wisconsin Card Sorting task
(WCST, Berg, 1948; Milner, 1963) a commonly used
clinical test to evaluate set-shifting ability in patients
with frontal lobe damage, some studies have shown
that OCD patients display marked impairments in
shifting attentional sets (Okasha et al., 2000; Fonte-
nelle et al., 2001; Veale et al., 2009); but see
(Abbruzzese et al., 1995, 1997; Purcell et al., 1998;
Simpson et al., 2006). In one such study the level of
the impairment correlated with the severity of the
symmetry/ordering obsessions (Lawrence et al.,
2006) suggesting that difficulties in shifting attention
may contribute to the development of these obses-
sions. Similar difficulties have also been reported not
only in patients suffering from schizophrenia (Cana-
van et al., 1989; Beatty and Monson, 1990) but also
Huntington’s disease (Malmo, 1974; Lysaker et al.,
1995; Everett et al., 2001).
In order to dissect out the underlying cognitive def-
icits that may contribute to impaired WCST perfor-
mance, which may include disrupted motivation,
attention, learning and memory, a multidimensional
discrimination task was developed for use in both
humans and marmosets (Roberts et al., 1989). The
task was based on intra-dimensional (ID) and extra-
dimensional (ED) shift studies of animal learning
(Mackintosh and Little, 1969). It required subjects to
attend to the different aspects of multidimensional
stimuli (varying in shape and lines for instance) and
either attend to the same dimension across discrimi-
nations (intra-dimensional shift) or shift attention
from one dimension to another [extra-dimensional
shifts; Dias et al., 1996a, b; Fig. 2a]; the latter is a
direct parallel of the switch from sorting cards
according to one category, to sorting them according
to another, that is at the core of the WCST. The test
also enabled direct comparison with another type of
cognitive flexibility that had commonly been studied
in primate neuropsychological studies (Jones and
Mishkin, 1972), namely reversal learning. Here, hav-
ing learned to respond to one of two stimuli in order
to receive reward, subjects had to reverse their
responding to the other, previously unrewarded stim-
ulus in order to gain reward.
By directly comparing the effects of excitotoxic
lesions of two distinct PFC regions, namely the orbi-
tofrontal cortex (OFC) and ventrolateral prefrontal
cortex (vlPFC), studies in marmosets revealed their
differential contribution to these two forms of cogni-
tive flexibility (Dias et al., 1996a,b). While OFC
lesions disrupted reversal learning but not attentional
set-shifting, vlPFC lesions disrupted attentional set-
shifting but not reversal learning [Fig. 2(b)], implicat-
ing the former in monitoring the changing affective
value of stimuli in the environment and the latter in
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Figure 2 Studying cognitive system dysfunction in the marmoset. (a) Schematic of the attentional
set shifting and reversal learning paradigm. In Intra-dimensional shifts, new exemplars, still varying
along the same two perceptual dimensions of shapes and lines are presented and the previously rele-
vant dimension for example, shape, remains relevant and animals must learn which of the two new
exemplars from that dimension is rewarded. In extra-dimensional shifts the relevant dimension is
changed (e.g., shape to line) and an exemplar from the new relevant dimension is now rewarded. In
contrast, in reversal, the exemplars and dimensions remain the same but the rewarding contingency
is reversed (e.g., shape A to shape B). (b) Number of trials required to reach criterion performance
during an extra-dimensional shift (attentional set shifting) and reversal after antOFC or vlPFC exci-
totoxic lesions. Bars represent the range of scores in each group (Dias et al., 1996a, b). (c) Schemat-
ic of the serial reversal learning paradigm, showing an example set of three trials. (d) Perseverative
errors (consecutive responses to the unrewarded exemplar, square-root transformed) made across
four reversals after excitotoxic lesions of antOFC or the medial caudate nucleus (Clarke et al.,
2008). Error bars represent SEM. (e) Depletions of 5-HT in the OFC and DA in the medial caudate
selectively impair reversal learning. (f) Schematic of the self-ordered spatial search task with 2-box
and 3-box examples. The locations of the boxes change across trials. (g) Number of perseverative
errors (consecutive responses to the same spatial location) made after antOFC or vlPFC excitotoxic
lesions (Walker et al., 2009). Error bars represent SEM. In all figures the location of the excitotoxic
lesions are shown on the diagram of the orbital (antOFC, vlPFC) or sagittal (medial caudate) view
of the brain. White bars (C) represent control group and stars (*) represent p< 0.05.
attentional control. This double dissociation was sub-
sequently replicated in human functional neuroimag-
ing studies (Hampshire and Owen, 2006) as well as
in rats (Birrell and Brown, 2000) and mice (Bisso-
nette et al., 2008), highlighting the forward and back
translatability of these findings. Further studies in the
marmoset have implicated the medial caudate nucle-
us in reversal learning (Clarke et al., 2008) with the
pattern of impairment similar to that seen following
OFC lesions. In both cases, animals displayed persev-
erative responding, whereby the previously rewarded
option is chosen repeatedly, despite the lack of
reward.
Marked differences in the underlying monoaminer-
gic modulation of these circuits have also been
revealed. Reductions in dopamine, but not serotonin
affect higher-order attentional selection in the vlPFC
(Roberts et al., 1994; Clarke et al., 2005). In contrast,
reductions of serotonin, but not dopamine, within the
OFC mimic the perseverative effects of excitotoxic
OFC lesions on reversal learning (Clarke et al., 2004,
2005, 2007). The converse, however, is the case at
the level of the caudate nucleus where reversal learn-
ing is impaired following reductions in dopamine but
not serotonin (Clarke et al., 2011). Thus, distinct neu-
rochemical systems at the level of the striatum and
OFC regulate reversal learning, and although both
serotonin and dopamine pathways richly innervate
the PFC, their contributions differ with respect to the
different forms of cognitive flexibility [Clarke et al.,
2008; Fig. 2(e)].
Together these findings provide considerable
insight into the specific fronto-striatal circuitry sub-
serving cognitive flexibility and are beginning to
reveal how these different forms of cognitive flexibil-
ity contribute to disorders such as schizophrenia and
OCD. For example, ED shifting, as assessed in the
CANTAB (Cambridge Neuropsychological Test
Automated Battery), generally shows a significant
impairment in OCD patients (Watkins et al., 2005;
Chamberlain et al., 2006). This deficit appears to be
pre-symptomatic as it is also present in their healthy,
first degree relatives (Chamberlain et al., 2007). This
may implicate altered functioning in vlPFC in OCD
patients and a recent report specifically links atten-
tional set-shifting performance and vlPFC function.
Specifically, decreased functional connectivity
between vlPFC and caudate at resting state was
linked to impairments in attentional set-shifting per-
formance and predicted greater number of errors dur-
ing ED shifts (Vaghi et al., 2016). In contrast, OCD
patients display mild or no detectable impairment in
reversal learning. However, they do show a speed-
for-accuracy trade off that has been correlated to the
severity of compulsions (Chamberlain et al., 2007,
2008; Valerius et al., 2008). Moreover, at the level of
underlying brain circuitry, OCD patients and their
unaffected first-degree relatives display decreased
recruitment of the OFC during reversal learning
(Chamberlain et al., 2007; Remijnse et al., 2013) and
symptom provocation (Morgie`ve et al., 2014) and
abnormalities in resting state activity in this region
(Menzies et al., 2008). A meta-analysis of imaging
studies highlights not only the OFC but also vlPFC
regions as areas with increased likelihood of activa-
tion in response to symptom provocation (Rotge
et al., 2008). Thus, altered activity in both OFC and
vlPFC circuitry involved in response reversal and
rule shifting, respectively, may underlie the impair-
ments in cognitive flexibility in OCD and contribute
to the compulsions and obsessions, respectively.
Similarly, patients with schizophrenia also show
marked deficits in shifting attentional sets (Elliott
et al., 1995; Morris et al., 1999; Pantelis et al., 1999;
McKirdy et al., 2009) and in reversal learning
(Thoma et al., 2007; Waltz and Gold, 2007; Leeson
et al., 2009). Performance on the latter is related to
the severity of the negative symptoms (Pantelis et al.,
1999; Leeson et al., 2009), which if they persisted
were linked to greater impairment in set shifting at
follow-up (Leeson et al., 2009). This pattern of
impairments also implicates dysfunctional OFC and
vlPFC circuits in the cognitive inflexibility associated
with schizophrenia, similar to that proposed for
OCD. However, the specific neural basis of these def-
icits across the disorders remains to be determined,
given that, for example, similar perseverative
responding in reversal learning is associated with dis-
rupted OFC or medial striatal activity (Dias et al.,
1996a; Clarke et al., 2008).
In schizophrenia, support for dysfunction within
the medial striatum is provided by evidence for dis-
turbances in activation and connectivity within this
region (Vink et al., 2006; Rolland et al., 2015) and
the finding that reduced functional activity within the
ventral striatum is associated specifically with
impaired reversal performance in unmedicated
patients compared with controls (Schlagenhauf et al.,
2014). This can be contrasted with the decreased
recruitment of the OFC during reversal learning in
OCD patients described above. It can be argued that
given vlPFC and OFC form part of a neural network
to control attentional set-shifting and reversal learn-
ing respectively, dysregulation at any node within the
network will disrupt its overall functioning. Howev-
er, identifying the underlying cause of that disruption
has important implications for the development of
therapeutic strategies for the two disorders. For
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example, studies in the marmoset have revealed that
the OFC and striatal mechanisms that underlie rever-
sal learning in the marmoset are differentially modu-
lated by serotonin and dopamine, respectively. Thus,
the improvement in OFC function and symptoms in
OCD patients following administration of selective
serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) (Nakao et al.,
2005; Saxena et al., 2009) would be predicted by the
selective actions of serotonin on reversal learning
within the marmoset OFC. It may also explain why
medicated OCD patients do not show errors in rever-
sal performance as the boosting of serotonin with
SSRI treatment may alleviate their reversal perfor-
mance deficits. In contrast, pharmacotherapies target-
ing the dopamine system (rather than SSRIs) would
be predicted to alleviate the striatal-related reversal
deficits in schizophrenia. Although both typical
(Michara and Goldberg, 2004) and atypical (Keefe
et al., 1999) antipsychotics primarily targeting dopa-
minergic function have been linked to general
improvements in cognitive function, whether schizo-
phrenia patients specifically benefit from antipsychot-
ic medication in terms of improvements in striatal
based cognitive flexibility remains to be determined.
Within the domain of cognitive symptoms, schizo-
phrenia patients also display impairments in working
memory (Green, 1996), which are also a core symp-
tom of attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder
(ADHD) (Westerberg et al., 2004; Lee and Park,
2005; Martinussen et al., 2005). Working memory is
the ability to hold information “on-line” in memory,
to update that information across time and to use that
information to guide responding. A variety of tests
has been used to study working memory including
delayed response tasks (Pontecorvo et al., 1996),
multi-arm mazes (commonly used in rodents; Dud-
chenko et al., 2013) and self-ordered search tasks
(Petrides, 1995a,b). An example of the latter devel-
oped in the marmoset is conceptually very similar to
the CANTAB self-ordered spatial search task used to
study working memory in patients (Owen et al.,
1990; Manes et al., 2002; Luciana, 2003; Chase et al.,
2008) It requires a combination of working memory,
response inhibition and strategy implementation abil-
ities [Fig. 2(f)]. Marmosets are presented with squares
simultaneously placed in two, three, or four spatial
locations (out of eight possible combinations) on a
touch-sensitive computer screen. On all trials, mar-
mosets are required to respond once only to each
square in a self-ordered sequence in order to receive
reward (Collins et al., 1998; Walker et al., 2009). In
the marmoset, excitotoxic lesions of the vlPFC, but
not OFC, dramatically impair performance [Walker
et al., 2009; Fig. 2(g)]. Marmosets are unable to attain
pre-lesion levels of performance and exhibit high
numbers of perseverative responses, as they touch the
same square repeatedly, failing to move on to the
next, previously untouched square. However, perfor-
mance can be rescued by removing the previously
touched square from the touchscreen until another
response has been made, thereby preventing persever-
ation of the immediately preceding response. This
suggests that the inability to solve this task stems
from a tendency to repeat previous responses.
In the human version of the task, patients with
schizophrenia and ADHD patients exhibit similar
impairments. Both adults (Dowson et al., 2004) and
children (Fried et al., 2015) with ADHD exhibit a pro-
found impairment in this task. Moreover, schizophre-
nia patients in particular fail to adopt a systematic
strategy and make numerous between-search errors,
performing worse than frontal lobe patients (Pantelis
et al., 1999; Badcock et al., 2005) and being impaired
even at first-episode psychosis (Joyce, 2002; Joyce
et al., 2005). This was evident even when controlling
for low visuo-spatial memory span, suggesting that
impaired executive function and strategy implementa-
tion are at the core of the working memory problem.
Deficits in spatial working memory extend to the
healthy monozygotic twins of patients (Pirkola et al.,
2005) or first degree relatives (Wood et al., 2003).
This would suggest that the working memory impair-
ment is an endophenotype of schizophrenia.
Whilst evidence from the clinical literature sup-
ports global prefrontal impairment in ADHD (Lenar-
towicz et al., 2014; Arai et al., 2015; Mattfeld et al.,
2015) and schizophrenia patients (Manoach, 2003;
Orfei et al., 2013; Pu et al., 2013; Marumo et al., 2014;
Buchy et al., 2015), the identification of the vlPFC as
critical for self-ordered spatial memory in marmosets
specifically implicates vlPFC impairment in this work-
ing memory deficit in patients. This is supported by the
accompanying profound dysfunction in attentional set
shifting, which also is associated with vlPFC dysfunc-
tion. Similarly, children (Kempton et al., 1999) and
adult (Clark et al., 2007) ADHD patients that exhibit
marked impairment in the self-ordered spatial search
task also show impaired response inhibition. Such defi-
cits in working memory can be ameliorated by either
domain specific cognitive training or psychostimulant
medication (Kempton et al., 1999; Bedard et al., 2004;
Mehta et al., 2004; Klingberg et al., 2002, 2005; see
Del Campo et al., 2011), the latter implicating the dopa-
mine or noradrenaline systems. In support of the dopa-
mine system, administration of a D1 agonist improves a
ketamine-induced deficit on the spatial-order search
task in marmosets (Nakako et al., 2013) suggesting that
the working memory processes in this task are under
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dopaminergic modulation. However, given that striatal
dysfunction is also implicated in these disorders (Dur-
ston et al., 2003; Cubillo et al., 2012 for a review) it
remains to be determined whether the improvements
are due to the actions of drugs at the level of the PFC or
striatum (see, e.g., Clatworthy et al., 2009).
In summary, the marmoset is proving an excellent
model in which to parse the neural circuitry and neuro-
chemical pathways that underlie the cognitive symp-
tomatology associated with a range of neuropsychiatric
disorders including OCD, schizophrenia, and ADHD.
This is an important first step toward stratification of
specific symptoms both within, as well as between, dis-
orders. Moreover, identification of the level within a
particular circuit from which a cognitive impairment
may arise, for example, PFC or striatum, and the spe-
cificity of the neurochemical modulation of that level
within the circuit, for example, dopamine or serotonin,
has important implications for targeting current thera-
pies more effectively. Future studies employing viral
mediated vectors to target specific pathways using
optogenetics or pharmacogenetics can further delineate
the circuit and the marmoset is an ideal model for such
studies with a highly differentiated prefrontal cortex
but a relatively small and lissencephalic brain.
DYSREGULATION OF NEGATIVE
VALENCE SYSTEMS, ATTENTIONAL
BIASES, AND FEAR GENERALIZATION
Although there are evolutionary advantages to fear
and anxiety (they can act as a protective defense
mechanism in dangerous situations), they can easily
become maladaptive and deleterious once left unreg-
ulated. Pathological anxiety, affecting more than
28% of the general population (Kessler et al., 2009),
specific phobias, PTSD, abnormally low mood in
depression and disturbances of emotion in schizo-
phrenia (Staring et al., 2009) are all a result of a dys-
regulated negative valence system. In generalized
anxiety disorder, patients exhibit pathological worry
and apprehension over long periods of time about sit-
uations that are normally causing no distress to the
healthy population (Tyrer and Baldwin, 2006; Craske
et al., 2009). In specific phobias and PTSD the worry
and distress are focused on, and triggered by, a single
event, situation or stimulus (Kessler et al., 2009;
Pacella et al., 2013).
A particularly prominent symptom in patients suf-
fering from all types of anxiety and depression is fear
over-generalization, whereby they indiscriminately
develop fearful responses to threatening and non-
threatening stimuli alike (Lissek et al., 2008; Craske
et al., 2009; Lissek et al., 2014). They also tend to
develop negative biases, not only within the affective
domain but also extending into the cognitive domain,
and influencing attention and memory (Murphy et al.,
1999; Gotlib et al., 2004; Mogg and Bradley, 2005;
Bar-Haim et al., 2007). It is still unclear whether fear
generalization and negative biases are causal to the
development of the disorder, or constitute underlying
symptoms that appear in its presence and contribute
to its maintenance. Evidence for the former comes
from the study of individuals within the healthy pop-
ulation who display quite dramatic differences in
anxiety. This variation in anxiety is recognized as a
stable personality trait. Individuals at the extreme
high end of this trait can be more at risk of develop-
ing pathological anxiety and, like individuals suffer-
ing from clinical anxiety, have a tendency to over-
generalize in fear provoking situations and display
mild negative biases (Sexton et al., 2010; Arnaudova
et al., 2013). Such behavioral traits are the product of
interactions between genes and early life experiences
(Nugent et al., 2011). Life experiences that may trig-
ger the development of these traits include physical
and psychological stressors, which impact on the
development of brain circuits underlying emotion.
Indeed, affective disorders commonly emerge during
childhood and adolescence (Jones, 2013), making the
study of gene–environmental interactions and brain
development important for our understanding of
emotion dysregulation.
The common marmoset, like humans, displays
marked individual responsivity to anxiety provoking
situations that appears stable across time and thus
trait-like in character. This makes the marmoset an
ideal species for studying emotion regulation and
dysregulation. Consequently, a range of specific tasks
have been developed to formally characterize their
anxious temperament and to measure fear over-
generalization and negative biases (Fig. 1). An
important aim in developing these tasks has been to
bridge the gap between existing studies of negative
emotion in rodents, monkeys and humans. The neural
mechanisms underlying fear and anxiety have been
extensively studied in rodents (LeDoux, 2000;
Maren, 2001; Davis et al., 2010; Tovote et al., 2015),
primarily using Pavlovian fear conditioning para-
digms (acute and sustained fear) and tests of innate
anxiety, such as the open field and elevated plus
maze (Belzung and Griebel, 2001). In contrast, spe-
cific tests of innate fear (responsivity to snakes) and
anxiety (responsivity to unknown humans) have been
more commonly used in non-human primates
(Izquierdo et al., 2005; Rudebeck et al., 2006; Kalin
et al., 2007; Machado and Bachevalier, 2008) making
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cross-species comparison and translation difficult.
Moreover, although fear conditioning has been used
to test both humans and rodents alike, the metric of
emotion differs between the two species; a behavioral
freezing response is commonly measured in rodents
contrasted to an autonomic and/or self-reported state
used in humans. Since an emotional state is the prod-
uct of changes across the range of outputs, both
behavioral and physiological, it is important to mea-
sure multiple aspects of the response in order to
Figure 3.
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determine the neural circuits that regulate emotional
states. This is particularly important since there are
strong brain-body-brain pathways resulting in
patients with anxiety and mood disorders being more
likely to suffer cardiovascular disease and vice versa
(Khawaja et al., 2009; Stapelberg et al., 2012).
A test commonly used to measure an anxious tem-
perament in macaque monkeys is the human intruder
test, whereby the experimental animal encounters an
unfamiliar human (Kalin and Shelton, 1989). The
unfamiliar intruder could be a potential “friend,” for
instance bringing food, or they could be a threat.
Hence, the ambiguity of the situation creates a state
of anxiety, with subjects varying in the extent to
which they approach the intruder. In the marmoset
version of the task, the level of anxiety is measured
based upon a component score that includes the dis-
tance the animal chooses to maintain between them-
selves and the intruder, their behavioral reactivity in
the form of calls made, and other attentive behaviors
such as body and head bobbing. This test is relatively
quick to perform, as it is based in the home cage,
requires no training and thus is ideal for screening
large numbers of animals. Another paradigm to
assess emotional reactivity in marmosets is based on
the response to a snake, which is a stimulus that pri-
mates find inherently fearful [Shiba et al., 2014a, b;
Fig. 3(a)]. Although the human intruder and snake
test measures are somewhat independent of one
another [see significant but weak correlation in Fig.
3(b)] and may measure overlapping but also distinct
aspects of negative emotion, for example, innate fear
versus uncertainty, they both reflect the general anx-
ious temperament of the animal. High scores in both
tests on repeated occasions indicate a high-anxious
phenotype in the marmoset. They have been linked to
structural alterations in the dorsal Anterior Cingulate
Cortex (dACC) [Fig. 3(c)] as measured by MRI and
reductions in serotonin release in the amygdala in
response to an acute dose of an SSRI, as measured by
in vivo microdialysis (Mikheenko et al., 2015). In
addition, microPET analysis of the 5-HTT has also
revealed lowered binding in the dACC related to
social anxiety in marmosets (Yokoyama et al., 2013).
The translational potential of this anxiety pheno-
type has been determined by studying an individual
marmoset’s ability to display discriminative fear con-
ditioning, and their responsivity to an uncertain or
ambiguous stimulus. The tendency to generalize
between threatening and non-threatening cues and
contexts, and the negative appraisal of neutral or
ambiguous cues (Hirsch and Mathews, 1997;
Constans et al., 1999), is characteristic of high trait-
anxious humans (Craske et al., 2009; Lissek, 2012;
Dymond et al., 2015) and rats (Duvarci et al., 2009).
Thus, it would be predicted that high anxious marmo-
sets would show a similar phenotype. Consequently,
Pavlovian discriminative fear conditioning has been
Figure 3 Dysregulation of negative valence systems. (a) Human intruder and snake tests are con-
ducted in the home-cage, with the animal separated from their cage mate in one quadrant of the
cage for a brief period. (b) The negative emotional response to the snake, as measured by the com-
ponent 1 (“Anxiety”) score in the Principal Component Analysis (PCA), is positively correlated
with the negative emotional response to the human intruder. AntOFC (red) and vlPFC (blue) excito-
toxic lesions increase negative emotion relative to controls (gray) but the lesioned animals remain
within the normal variation of trait anxiety within the colony (Agustın-Pavon et al., 2012). (c) Two
clusters (dACC, labeled, and posterior cingulate cortex) identified by tensor based morphometry
analysis were negatively correlated with high anxiety in the human intruder test. (d) Schematic of
discriminative fear conditioning apparatus. The CS1 is paired with an aversive loud noise (300–
600 ms car siren at 118 dB), whereas the CS2 is paired with a neutral event (0.5 s of darkness). (e)
Example of conditioned behavioral (vigilant scanning, time in seconds) and cardiovascular (heart
rate, beats/min) responses. “Vigilant scanning” includes attentive visual search of surroundings in
combination with forward extension of body/head and rearing. A conditioned heart rate rise is
observed for the CS1 (blue) but not for the CS2 (gray) indicating successful discrimination
between the two stimuli. (f) Correlation between component 1 score (“Anxiety”) and performance
in discriminative fear conditioning. High scoring in component 1 was associated with failure to
achieve discriminative conditioned cardiovascular responses to CS1 and CS2. (g) Schematic rep-
resentation of the marmoset SLC6A4 promoter region showing 32 repeats. Third, fourth, and 23rd
repeats containing the double and the two single-nucleotide polymorphisms, respectively, are shad-
ed in gray. (h) Comparison of component 1 (“Anxiety”) behavioral scores derived from the PCA of
the HIT performance. Error bars represent SEM. (i) The human intruder test was used to assess anx-
iety levels in response to vehicle and to a single dose of 2.5 mg/kg or 10 mg/kg citalopram, 25 min
prior to the intruder phase. Effects on average distance (cm) are shown (Santangelo et al., 2016).
Error bars represent SEM, stars (*) represent p< 0.05.
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developed for marmosets based on paradigms used
effectively in humans (Lau et al., 2008; Lissek et al.,
2008) and rodents (Herry et al., 2008). It involves the
presentation of two distinct auditory cues, one of
which is paired with a mildly aversive loud noise
[300–600 ms car siren at 118 dB; the specific param-
eters are adjusted for each individual animal based on
their performance; Fig. 3(d)]. Successful discrimina-
tive conditioning is demonstrated by the development
of conditioned attentional orienting/vigilant scanning
responses and heightened heart rate [Fig. 3(e)] in
response to the stimulus paired with the loud noise
but not the alternative stimulus paired with a neutral
event, (0.5 s period of darkness). Animals that had
shown higher anxiety and avoidance of the rubber
snake were unable to successfully learn such a dis-
crimination and their conditioned autonomic and
behavioral responses generalized to the safety cue or
to the context [Shiba et al., 2014b; Fig. 3(f)], much
like high trait anxious humans who tend to generalize
from threatening, aversive, and negative stimuli to
neutral ones. Importantly, marmosets that failed to
learn discriminative fear conditioning were perfectly
successful in learning an appetitive Pavlovian dis-
crimination paradigm by discriminating the same
auditory cues when they were predictive of reward.
High anxious marmosets also displayed high levels
of behavioral vigilance when presented with a novel,
neutral cue in a threatening context (Mikheenko
et al., 2015). This is a form of pseudo-conditioning as
the aversive loud noise and a neutral stimulus were
presented within the same test session but were not
correlated with one another, yet high anxious marmo-
sets still developed conditioned responses to the neu-
tral stimulus.
High anxious marmosets and humans not only dis-
play a similar behavioral phenotype but that pheno-
type may also share common genetic influences. In
humans, variation within the serotonin transporter
gene (SLC6A4) that results in reduced gene expres-
sion has been linked to a high trait anxiety phenotype
(Lesch et al., 1996; Canli and Lesch, 2007; Caspi
et al., 2010) and marked changes in the activity of
emotion circuits in the brain (Brown and Hariri,
2006; Murphy et al., 2013); although meta-analyses
have called into question the gene-behavior associa-
tion (Munafo et al., 2009; Risch et al., 2009). Recent-
ly, genetic variation in the SLC6A4 upstream repeat
region of the marmoset has also been linked to differ-
ential SLC6A4 gene expression, with lower gene
expression being associated with heightened anxiety
on the human intruder test [Santangelo et al., 2016;
Fig. 3(g,h)]. This gene–behavioral association in the
marmoset highlights the potential advantage to
studying such relationships in a purpose-bred primate
colony. The relatively controlled environment dra-
matically reduces the impact of variation in life expe-
riences on an individual’s behavior, allowing gene–
behavior relationships to be more easily revealed
compared with that of humans.
Further exploration of the phenotype has revealed
that genetic variation in the SLC6A4 gene is related
to opposing effects of an acute dose of a selective
serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI) on anxious
behavior. The low gene expressing, high trait anxious
marmosets displayed an anxiogenic response in con-
trast to the anxiolytic response of the high gene
expressing, low trait anxious marmosets [Santangelo
et al., 2016; Fig. 3(i)]. These results bridge the gap
between the findings in humans that report reduced
responsivity to the therapeutic effects of chronic
SSRI treatment in low expressing carriers with anxi-
ety disorders (Perna et al., 2005) and depression
(Keers et al., 2011; Porcelli et al., 2012), and the indi-
vidual differences in sensitivity to the anxiogenic
effect of acute SSRIs (Harmer and Cowen, 2013).
This finding implicates SCL6A4 genetic variation in
the latter (Harmer et al., 2006; Murphy et al., 2009)
which may provide insight into the underlying brain
mechanisms that account for the later improvement
of the clinical symptoms observed in high expressing
carriers. The marmoset model therefore has enor-
mous potential for revealing the interactions between
the SCL6A4 gene and functional activity in the sero-
tonin system in the control of behavior.
Changes in activity of brain networks that are asso-
ciated with heightened anxiety and dysregulated neg-
ative emotion, upon which serotonin may act, have
been reported by functional neuroimaging studies of
high trait anxious individuals in the healthy popula-
tion (Killgore and Yurgelun-Todd, 2005, Bishop,
2007) as well as in adults (Etkin and Wager, 2007;
Milad and Rauch, 2007, Price & Drevets, 2010), chil-
dren and adolescents (Monk et al., 2006; Guyer et al.,
2008; Strawn et al., 2012) with specific anxiety disor-
ders. These implicate a number of prefrontal subre-
gions including the OFC and vlPFC. However,
whether those changes are causal to the phenotype or
merely compensatory cannot be determined in
humans.
Such cause and effect has been established in mar-
mosets, by studying the effects of selective excito-
toxic lesions of the anterior OFC (antOFC) and
vlPFC on fear and anxiety. At face value, the effects
of both lesions seemed almost identical, increasing
anxiety as measured by the human intruder test,
increasing innate fear in response to a snake stimulus
[Fig. 3(b)] and inducing inflexible conditioned
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cardiovascular and behavioral fear responses follow-
ing acute alterations in the pairing of a stimulus with
aversive loud noise (Agustın-Pavon et al., 2012;
Shiba et al., 2014a). This resembles the robust pattern
of conditioned fear found in anxiety patients who dis-
play stronger responses to conditioned cues during
extinction and are delayed in extinguishing responses
compared with controls (Wessa and Flor, 2007; Duits
et al., 2015). Whilst the effects of OFC lesions on
tests of anxiety and innate fear have been somewhat
variable in macaque monkeys (Izquierdo et al., 2005;
Rudebeck et al., 2006; Kalin et al., 2007; Machado
and Bachevalier, 2008) the reasons for these discrep-
ancies have been attributed mostly to differences in
lesion methodology, lesion extent and task sensitivity
(for a thorough discussion on the issue see Shiba
et al., 2016). The anxiety phenotype induced by
antOFC and vlPFC lesions in marmosets altered the
entire repertoire of behaviors that contributed to the
high anxiety trait, including all aspects of behavior,
coping strategy and emotionality. The finding that the
lesion-induced heightened anxiety remained within
the “normal” range of such behavior displayed by
marmosets within the colony [Fig. 3(b)] highlights
the important role that both regions play in determin-
ing levels of trait anxiety. Moreover, the apparently
similar symptomatology associated with lesions to
two distinct regions of PFC illustrates the multivari-
ate nature of anxiety.
The question remains as to what is the distinct con-
tribution of these two prefrontal regions to the anxi-
ety phenotype, the answer of which will help to
stratify anxiety disorders and develop targeted treat-
ments. Besides the failure to regulate negative emo-
tions, patients with anxiety and depression often
make poor decisions. Because they are particularly
sensitive to negative information, they tend to per-
ceive threat with increased intensity and are more
risk averse (Murphy et al., 2003; Dickson, 2006;
Smoski et al., 2008; Mueller et al., 2010) and thus
display negative biases when making decisions
(Bradley et al., 1998; Murphy et al., 1999; Mogg
et al., 2000; Williams et al., 2007; Peckham et al.,
2010). Indeed, reductions in serotonin within the
OFC of marmosets have been implicated in such neg-
ative biases (Rygula et al., 2015) as identified in a
probabilistic discrimination task similar to that used
to reveal altered activity in prefronto-amygdala cir-
cuitry related to negative biases in depressed patients
(Taylor Tavares et al., 2008).
To compare the impact of antOFC and vlPFC inac-
tivation in marmosets on decision making we devel-
oped an approach-avoidance instrumental decision-
making task. In this task, animals optimize their
reward by responding equally to two, equivalently
rewarded left and right locations on a touch-sensitive
computer screen. In occasional probe sessions, super-
imposed over the reward schedule, an aversive loud
noise, a form of punishment, is associated with
responding at one of the two locations. This results in
a conflict at that location between responding to gain
reward, and avoiding responding due to the punish-
ment. However, animals normally maintain respond-
ing to both stimuli, choosing to optimize reward,
despite the occasional punishment. However, tran-
sient pharmacological inactivation of the antOFC and
vlPFC alters performance in distinct ways. Inactiva-
tion of the vlPFC has no impact on overall levels of
responding but causes the animal to avoid making the
punished response, resulting in many more responses
being made to the side on which responding only
receives reward. Hence, the cost-benefit balance of
responding for reward in the face of punishment is
switched from a positive approach response to a neg-
ative avoidance response. In contrast, inactivation of
antOFC has no effect on the day of receiving punish-
ment, but it acts to bias responding away from the
punished side the following day, presumably as a
consequence of its effects on memory consolidation
(Clarke et al., 2015).
The vlPFC has been implicated in attentional proc-
essing and specifically the shifting of higher-order
attentional sets as described in the cognitive section
above. Thus, a parsimonious account of the on-line
negative bias induced by inactivation of the vlPFC is
that the marmoset is unable to shift attention away
from the intrinsically salient aversive loud noise and
toward the rewarding aspects of the context in order
to perform a cost-benefit analysis. Consequently, this
prolonged attention to the aversive stimulus leads to
the negative bias. This hypothesis is also consistent
with the contribution of the vlPFC to cognitive re-
appraisal, whereby individuals explicitly shift their
attention from a salient negative interpretation of a
context to a more positive interpretation (Buhle et al.,
2014), and down-regulation of emotion during con-
flict and acceptance of unfair outcomes (Tabibnia
et al., 2008; Feng et al., 2015). Consequently, it is
proposed that a compromised vlPFC induces anxiety
because subjects fail to switch their attention away
from negative events.
On the other hand, the antOFC inactivation-
induced negative bias is not linked to the online
appraisal and processing of the negative stimulus but
rather to its memory. The OFC has been linked to the
development of stimulus-reward associations and the
ability to predict outcomes, particularly within proba-
bilistic contexts (Schoenbaum and Roesch, 2005;
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Schoenbaum et al., 2007; Balleine et al., 2011; Wal-
ton et al., 2011; Rudebeck and Murray, 2014). There-
fore, it can be argued that a compromised OFC
makes the punishment no longer predictable. This
learned state of uncertainty leads to establishment of
a stronger punishment memory that underlies the
negative bias and avoidance behavior upon its
retrieval the next day. This is consistent with the role
of uncertain environments in the development of anx-
ious responses (Grupe and Nitschke, 2013). The neg-
ative bias is abolished by inactivation of either the
amygdala or the hippocampus on the day of retrieval,
or disconnection of the two, implicating an OFC-
amygdala-hippocampal network that drives the
expression of such negative biases. This account of
the symptoms of anxiety and depression induced by
compromised OFC function differs from that pro-
posed above for vlPFC dysfunction. Instead of an
inability to down-regulate responses on-line, a dys-
functional OFC may leave the system unregulated
and result in the learning of maladaptive negative
associations due to a failure to predict aversive out-
comes, supporting the negative cognitions prevalent
in anxiety and depression.
In summary, the marmoset model has allowed the
investigation of regulation and dysregulation within
the negative valence system (Fig. 1) at both the indi-
vidual- (trait anxiety and genetic variation in the
serotonin transporter gene) and circuit-based levels
(prefronto-amygdala-hippocampal manipulations).
The finding of an interaction between the serotonin
transporter gene and the effects of acute SSRI treat-
ment on anxious behavior has implications for the
individual targeting of treatments. On the other hand,
the proposed roles of vlPFC and antOFC, respective-
ly, in attentional processing and in the prediction of
negative outcomes, provide an important framework
for the stratification of anxiety disorders. Future stud-
ies will focus on the contributions of other regions of
PFC that have been implicated in the regulation of
negative emotion, including primate dorsolateral PFC
(Buhle et al., 2014) and peri- and sub-genual anterior
cingulate cortex (Drevets et al., 2008; Etkin et al.,
2011). While numerous studies have implicated the
prelimbic and infralimbic regions of ACC in rodents,
respectively, in the expression and extinction of
freezing to a conditioned fear stimulus, their putative
homology to primate peri-and subgenual ACC
remains unclear (for a critical review see Myers-
Schulz and Koenigs, 2012). This further emphasizes
the importance of the marmoset primate model in
parsing out the distinct cognitive functions of, and
interactions between, these prefrontal brain regions
and their downstream targets, in the control of
negative emotion. It will also provide the basis by
which we can determine the neurobiological and psy-
chological mechanisms underlying the action of cur-
rent pharmacotherapies that target the serotonin (e.g.,
SSRIs), noradrenaline (selective noradrenergic reup-
take inhibitors) and glutamatergic (e.g., ketamine)
systems in the treatment of dysregulated emotions.
Only then can these treatments be targeted appropri-
ately to the individual.
IMPAIRED POSITIVE VALENCE:
MODELING ANHEDONIA
Positive valence systems, as defined by the RDoC
framework, are responsible for responding to positive
situations and contexts, including reward seeking,
consummatory behaviors and reward/habit learning.
Dysfunction within these systems occurs in a number
of major psychiatric disorders. One specific example
of a clinical symptom involving disturbed positive
valence is anhedonia (Fig. 1). Anhedonia is defined
according to the DSM (I–V) as “decreased interest or
pleasure in most activities, most of each day” and is
prevalent in about 37% of depressed patients (Kessler
et al., 2009). Indeed, for a patient to be diagnosed
with depression they must suffer from one or other
form of anhedonia or depressed mood (DSM V).
Besides depression, anhedonia constitutes one of the
primary negative symptoms of schizophrenia, being
present in half of the patients (Pelizza and Ferrari,
2009), is present in eating disorders (Davis and
Woodside, 2002) and is associated with withdrawal
in drug abuse (Markou and Koob, 1991). It has also
been reported in a number of neurodegenerative dis-
orders, including Parkinson’s Disease (Isella et al.,
2003) and Alzheimer’s disease (Starkstein et al.,
2005).
Clinically, it has been identified by self-report
measures of hedonic experiences using a variety of
questionnaires, such as the Snaith Hamilton (Snaith
et al., 1995) and Fawcett–Clark Pleasure scales (Faw-
cett et al., 1983). The majority of the questions on
these scales focus on the consummatory aspects of
positive experiences such as “one food tastes as good
as another to me.” As a consequence, pre-clinical
models of depression have tended to use the sucrose
consumption test as the primary measure of anhedo-
nia (Slattery et al., 2007) when investigating novel
pharmacotherapies. However, preclinical neurobio-
logical studies of positive valence systems have rec-
ognized motivational, reinforcing, decision making
and consummatory components [see Treadway and
Zald (2011) for a comprehensive review], all of
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which can be parsed at the level of neural circuits and
neurochemistry. Thus, anhedonia could arise from a
lack of the ability not only to experience pleasure
(consummatory anhedonia) but also to anticipate
pleasure (anticipatory anhedonia). Indeed, a failure to
anticipate pleasure has a major impact on an individ-
ual’s motivation to seek out pleasure (motivational
anhedonia). Treadway and Zald (2011) further pro-
posed the concept of decisional anhedonia to include
the effects of anhedonia on decision making in the
context of reward.
Recently, distinctions between these different
types of anhedonia have begun to emerge in clinical
research. For example, patients with depression show
anticipatory (McFarland and Klein, 2009) as opposed
to consummatory anhedonia (Dichter et al., 2010).
On the other hand, schizophrenia patients show intact
anticipation of reward but deficits in motivational/
effortful responding for reward, a form of apathy
(Gard et al., 2009, 2014). Another distinction to have
arisen is that between self-report measures of pleasur-
able experiences retrospectively and experiencing
pleasure per se. In particular, patients with schizo-
phrenia and depression do not show reductions in
their hedonic response to different sucrose solutions
compared with controls, despite scoring high on the
Chapman and Fawcett anhedonia questionnaires
(Amsterdam et al., 1987; Berlin et al., 1998).
Moreover, self-reported affective flattening and anhe-
donia in schizophrenia, as measured by question-
naires, is actually associated with an almost normal
experience of emotion as measured by hedonic rat-
ings during the experience of pleasant stimuli, includ-
ing pictures, films, words, or faces (Burbridge and
Barch, 2007; Heerey and Gold, 2007; Tremeau et al.,
2010). This inconsistency between retrospective self-
reports of anhedonia and the actual on-line experi-
ence may well be a consequence of the reliance of
clinical questionnaires on the ability of patients to
“represent” hedonic experience, as opposed to the
hedonic experience per se. This ability to “represent”
consummatory pleasure is also a major component of
anticipatory and motivational hedonic processes and
thus illustrates the difficulty in interpreting self-
report questionnaires in the clinical population.
Considerable insight into the distinct consummato-
ry, anticipatory and motivational components of
reward processing has been gained from neurobiolog-
ical and neurochemical studies at the level of the stri-
atum and amygdala of both rodents (Cardinal et al.,
2002; Wassum and Izquierdo, 2015) and monkeys
(Schultz et al., 2000; Schultz, 2004; Murray, 2007;
Bermudez and Schultz, 2010). The anhedonia associ-
ated with depression, however, is linked to altered
activity within the ventromedial PFC (Keedwell
et al., 2005). This is a complex region in humans
Figure 4 Parsing consummatory and anticipatory aspects of positive valence in the marmoset. (a)
Schematic of discriminative appetitive conditioning apparatus. CS1 resulted in opening of the door
revealing food box with reward (e.g., right), whereas CS2 resulted in presentation of empty food
box (e.g., left). The anticipatory period entails viewing the full food box and is followed by the con-
summatory period, when marmosets are allowed access to the reward. (b) Conditioned behavioral
response during the anticipatory phase is measured by the number of orienting head movements
(head jerks) toward the food box. Consummatory behavior is measured by the latency to eat the
reward (“L”, seconds) and the amount of reward eaten (grams). A conditioned systolic blood pres-
sure rise is observed for the CS1 (Light red for anticipatory period, dark red for consummatory
period) but not for the CS2 (gray). (c) Systolic blood pressure response during the CS1 after exci-
totoxic lesions of the amygdala (lined bars) presented for the anticipatory (Light red) and the con-
summatory (Dark red) periods compared with controls (empty bars) (Braesicke et al., 2005). Error
bars represent SEM, stars (*) represent p< 0.05.
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composed of a number of discrete cytoarchitectonic
areas, including Brodmann’s areas 10, 14, 25, and 32,
and their contribution to the regulation of reward
processing and their interaction with striatal and
amygdala reward systems is unknown. This again
highlights the need for studies in a primate in which
the organization of ventromedial PFC appears far
similar to humans than that of rodents (Myers-Schulz
and Koenigs, 2012).
We have developed a paradigm in the marmoset
that distinguishes between the consummatory and
anticipatory aspects of pleasure and uses independent
measures of the behavioral and autonomic arousal
(cardiovascular) components. The latter is seldom
measured in studies of reward processing in animals
(but see Rudebeck et al., 2014) but can be an impor-
tant component of positive emotional responses, as it
is for negative emotions, and is often the metric used
in humans, alongside self-report questionnaires.
Using a Pavlovian procedure [Fig. 4(a)], one version
of the paradigm used the “sight of the food” viewed
through a transparent door of a food box as the condi-
tioned stimulus. This constitutes the anticipatory
period and was followed by the consummatory period
when the door opened, resulting in access to the
reward. With training, a conditioned rise in systolic
blood pressure accompanied by approach behavior
toward the food box developed during the anticipato-
ry period, as the animals learned that the presentation
of the food box was predictive of subsequent reward
[Fig. 4(b)]. In contrast, the rise in blood pressure that
accompanied the consummatory period was present
from the beginning. The consummatory arousal was,
nevertheless, motivational in nature since it was only
seen in the context of the marmosets gaining access
to their preferred, high incentive reward and not the
food pellets that they received daily (Braesicke et al.,
2005). Consistent with the role of the amygdala in
appetitive conditioning, excitotoxic lesions of the
amygdala in the marmoset reduced anticipatory
behavioral responses directed toward the conditioned
stimulus, as shown previously in rodents (Holland,
1999) and also reduced the conditioned cardiovascu-
lar arousal. In contrast there was no effect on the
food box approach response or the cardiovascular
arousal during the consummatory period. Thus, dam-
age to the amygdala induced anticipatory but not con-
summatory anhedonia [Fig. 4(c)].
A revised version of the Pavlovian paradigm has
since been developed to identify the brain mecha-
nisms underlying the ability of marmosets to adapt
their anticipatory hedonic responses to changes in
environmental contingencies. Animals were condi-
tioned to discriminate between two auditory stimuli,
either predicting reward (CS1) or an empty food box
(CS2). Changes in behavioral and cardiovascular
arousal during the CSs were assessed both after a sin-
gle extinction session, in which the decline in condi-
tioned cardiovascular arousal was measured
following omission of the expected reward and after
reversal of the reinforcing contingencies, in which
the previous CS2 became the CS1, and vice versa.
So far this revised version has been used to study the
contribution of the antOFC to the regulation of appe-
titive Pavlovian conditioning. Marmosets with exci-
totoxic lesions of the antOFC failed to show the
normal decline in the conditioned systolic blood pres-
sure response after reward omission, instead showing
a prolonged arousal response. Moreover, upon rever-
sal, antOFC lesioned animals were much slower to
reverse their blood pressure response. Significantly,
even when the cardiovascular response was success-
fully reversed, conditioned behavior was not (Reekie
et al., 2008). This was in marked contrast to controls
in which there was strong coupling between the rate
of reversal learning of the conditioned behavioral and
cardiovascular responses. Thus, antOFC lesions
caused uncoupling of cardiovascular and behavioral
responses. This is particularly relevant for the
motivational-anticipatory distinction in anhedonia, as
a patient may display cardiovascular anticipatory
arousal, but due to uncoupling this may fail to result
in motivated behavior.
Future studies in marmosets are ideally placed to
focus on the contribution of the distinct regions of the
ventromedial PFC in the regulation of striatal and
amygdala reward processing, including their modula-
tion of the monoamine systems. Downregulation of
striatal activity (Heller et al., 2009; Robinson et al.,
2012) and of striatal dopamine receptors in particular
(Cannon et al., 2009), has been reported in depressed
subjects, along with reductions in amygdala respon-
sivity to happy faces (Beesdo et al., 2009), the latter
being correlated with symptoms of anhedonia (Stuhr-
mann et al., 2013). An understanding of the relation-
ship between these cortical and subcortical changes
and their causal role in the anhedonic symptoms will
inform treatment strategies since the symptom of
anhedonia appears particularly resistant to current
pharmacotherapies. It is largely unresponsive to SSRI
based treatments of depression (Shelton and Tom-
arken, 2001; Dunlop and Nemeroff, 2007) and simi-
larly fails to improve when SSRI administration is
used as an add-on therapy in schizophrenia (Sepehry
et al., 2007). Whilst drugs that target the dopamine
system are successful in alleviating many symptoms
of depression and schizophrenia, reports of the direct
effects of such drugs on anhedonic symptoms are
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mixed (Nutt et al., 2007). This may not be surprising
since evidence from psychopharmacological experi-
ments in animals implicates dopamine primarily in
motivational and reward prediction processes rather
than pleasure per se (Robbins and Everitt, 1992; Sala-
mone, 1997; Berridge and Robinson, 1998; Denk
et al., 2005; Schultz et al., 2015). Thus, depending
upon what type of anhedonia a patient is displaying,
for example, consummatory, anticipatory, or motiva-
tional, the neurochemical target for alleviating anhe-
donia may differ.
UTILITY OF THE MARMOSET IN FUTURE
INVESTIGATIONS OF NEURAL AND
COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT RELEVANT
TO MENTAL HEALTH
Seventy five per cent of patients with a mental disor-
der will have shown neuropsychiatric symptoms by
age 25 (Kessler et al., 2005), making the first years of
life extremely important for understanding the devel-
opment of neuropsychiatric disorders and their
behavioral dimensions. The marmoset has distinct
but, relatively, short duration developmental stages,
compared with old world monkeys, lasting just a few
months each, until they reach adulthood and sexual
maturity at approximately 18-20 months (Abbott
et al., 2003; see Schultz-Darken et al., 2016 for a
comprehensive review). These developmental stages
have been well characterized in terms of typical
behaviors observed, including social interactions
(Chalmers and Locke-Haydon, 1984), vocalizations
(Pistorio et al., 2006; Braun et al., 2015), and sensori-
motor abilities (Piper et al., 1992; Kaplan and Rog-
ers, 2006; Izumi et al., 2012). Moreover, the impact
of early life experiences, such as maternal depriva-
tion and infant isolation, on some of these behavioral
outcomes, as well as on levels of cortisol, adrenaline
and noradrenaline are already known (Dettling et al.,
2002; Pryce et al., 2004; Dettling et al., 2007). This
research provides the community with a useful tool-
box to study gene-environment interactions and the
effects of early life experiences on cognitive and
affective development and pinpoints the different
milestones of physical ability according to age. As
Schultz-Darken et al. (2016) highlight, marmosets
pose the great advantage of primarily breeding twins,
which allows the direct comparison of subjects with
the same genetic background after being placed in
different experimental conditions. What remains to
be studied is how cognitive functions are acquired in
the marmoset in relation to brain development in
order to inform our understanding of the emergence
of neuropsychiatric disorders.
In humans, the development of cognitive func-
tions, including reversal learning and attentional set-
shifting occur at different ages (Luciana, 2003;
Davidson et al., 2006) and are affected by early life
experiences and the home environment (Sarsour
et al., 2011). Unraveling the genetic and environmen-
tal contribution to this development is difficult in
humans because of the complexity of, and the lack of
experimental control over, their environment. In the
marmoset, the relationship between the development
of these cognitive processes and their underlying neu-
ral circuit can be determined in a highly controlled
environment. Taking advantage of their quick pro-
gression from infancy to adulthood, the common
problem of high attrition rates in human studies of
development (Barnett, 1995) and the impossibility of
following subjects over a period of twenty years can
be overcome. Young marmosets can be assessed with
CANTAB tasks using a home-cage apparatus that
allows testing in a relaxed environment (Crofts et al.,
1999; Takemoto et al., 2011) while neuroimaging
will be used to determine brain alterations across the
different developmental stages. These aspects of
development can also be studied as predictors of anx-
ious phenotypes in adulthood in conjunction with
genetic variations, which would provide a rich data-
set for studying the development of neuropsychiatric
disorders.
CONCLUSIONS
In conclusion, the marmoset is proving a valuable
species in which to study many of the symptoms of
neuropsychiatric disorders associated with dysfunc-
tion within cognitive, negative and positive valence
systems (Fig. 1). In the marmoset, a range of tests
have been developed which are designed to dissect
out the behavioral dimensions that underlie these
symptoms. Some of these dimensions are already
being successfully mapped on to specific prefrontal
circuits and neurochemical pathways within the mar-
moset using a range of neurobiological techniques
including temporary or permanent brain manipula-
tions, microdialysis, microPET, and structural MRI.
The new generation of viral mediated tools for target-
ing chemically specific neural pathways, including
opto- and pharmacogenetics, in combination with flu-
orodeoxyglucose and receptor ligand based micro-
PET and high field MRI for measuring functional and
resting state activity will reveal interactions between
and within cognitive and emotional circuits. While
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marmosets may not replace Old World macaques for
studying certain aspects of higher-order executive
functioning, their compact, but highly developed pri-
mate brains, small body size and thus ease of keeping
large groups of marmosets in spacious accommoda-
tion make them the ideal primate for large scale
research programs investigating cortical–subcortical
circuit interactions. Moreover, their relatively short 5
month gestation and 2 year period of development
provides a major opportunity to determine the effects
of genetic and behavioral risk factors for neuropsy-
chiatric disorders on the development of these neuro-
cognitive circuits and neurochemical modulatory
pathways across childhood and adolescence, in order
to understand their impact on complex cognitive and
emotional behaviors.
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